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The paper analyzes the effect of the generosity of the welfare state on the skill composition of immigrants.
We develop a parsimonious model in which the effect of an increase in the generosity (and taxes) of
the welfare state on the skill composition of immigrants under free migration is negative. The reason
is that welfare state benefits attract unskilled migrants because they contribute to tax revenues less
than what they gain from benefits; and this generosity works to deter skilled immigrants, because they
contribute in taxes more than in benefits. In sharp contrast, the effect of an increase in the generosity
(and taxes) of the welfare state on the skill composition of migrants is positive if migration is controlled
by policy. Being net contributors to the welfare state, skilled migrants can help finance a more generous
welfare-state system; thus, they are preferred by the policy maker over unskilled migrants. We take
the prediction of the model to cross-sectional data on source-host, OECD-EU country pairs in the year
2000. The identification strategy is to use the decomposition the source-host country pairs into two
groups: one group, a "free migration" group, source-host country pairs within the EU, and another
group, "policy-controlled migration" group, the pairs from non-EU countries into the EU. We find
evidence in support of the predictions of the parsimonious model, that the generosity of the welfare
state adversely affects the skill-composition of migrants under free migration; but it exerts a  more
positive effect under controlled migration, relative to the free migration regime.
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ar256@cornell.eduis positive if migration is controlled by policy. Being net contribu-
tors to the welfare state, skilled migrants can help ￿nance a more
generous welfare-state system; thus, they are preferred by the policy
maker over unskilled migrants. We take the prediction of the model
to cross-sectional data on source-host, OECD-EU country pairs in the
year 2000. The identi￿cation strategy is to use the decomposition the
source-host country pairs into two groups: one group, a "free migra-
tion" group, source-host country pairs within the EU, and another
group, "policy-controlled migration" group, the pairs from non-EU
countries into the EU. We ￿nd evidence in support of the predictions
of the parsimonious model, that the generosity of the welfare state
adversely a⁄ects the skill-composition of migrants under free migra-
tion; but it exerts a more positive e⁄ect under controlled migration,
relative to the free migration regime..
1 Introduction
The paper addresses the e⁄ect of the generosity of the welfare state on the
skill composition of immigrants.
Free migration has been one of the important qualities of the integration
of Europe into the European Union. Freedom of movement, and the ability
to reside and work anywhere within the EU, are one of the fundamental
rights to which member states of the EU are obligated towards each other.1
1Despite the legal provision for the free movement of labor among EU-15 (the old
member countries), the level of cross-border labor mobility is low. Reasons cited for this
include the existence of legal and administrative barriers, the lack of familiarity with other
European languages, moving costs, ine¢ cient housing markets, the limited portability of
2In contrast, labor mobility into the EU members states from non EU states,
is still restricted by national policies. This di⁄erence in policy regimes across
EU and non EU states provides an opportunity to test theory predictions
about key di⁄erences between free and policy-controlled migration.
The di⁄erences in migration policies are also tightly linked to the generos-
ity of the welfare state. For example, an impetus for relaxing migration re-
strictions by EU member states, towards non-EU countries, is that birth rates
dwindle and life expectancy goes on rising. Consequently, EU native born
population is both declining and ageing. A declining productive workforce
needed to ￿nance the increased economic burden of the costly welfare-state
institutions, puts a downward pressure on output growth. One alternative is
to adopt more liberal migration policies, especially towards skilled migrants,
solidifying the ￿nancial soundedness of the welfare state. Unskilled migrants,
in contrast, which are usually heavy users of the bene￿ts of the welfare state,
may put further strains on the welfare state. Therefore, voters in an ageing
welfare state may opt for a migration policy which will be more liberal and
also upgrade the skill composition of migration.2
pension rights, problems with the international recognition of professional quali￿cations
and the lack of transparency of job openings. The expansion of the EU to 25 member states
in May 2004, was accompanied by concerns over the possibility of a wave of migration ￿
particularly of the low-skilled ￿from the then ten new member states to the EU-15.
2The Financial Times puts it sucsinctly: "Over the next 10 years Germany faces a
demographic disaster and immigrantion could be part of the solution. As the birth rate
dwindles and life expectancy goes on rising, the country￿ s population is both declining
and ageing. Unless this double-whammy is confronted head-on, the economy will collapse
under the weight of an expensive welfare state that lacks the productive workforce to
￿nance it. Something has to be done ￿ and fast ￿ as Germany￿ s leaders and parts of
3We present a parsimonious model which predicts that the generosity of
the welfare state serves as a magnet to unskilled migrants, but as a deterrent
to skilled migration. Furthermore, voters in relatively more generous welfare
states are more likely to opt for migration policies that are more lax towards
skilled migration and more tight towards unskilled migration. As a result,
countries with more generous welfare systems are expected to have their skill
composition of migrants biased towards unskilled migration, relative to coun-
tries with less generous welfare systems, if migration is free. The opposite is
true when migration is controlled by national policies. Countries with more
generous welfare systems are expected to have their skill composition of mi-
grants biased towards skilled migration, if its voters can restrict migration,
relative to countries with less generous welfare systems.
In this paper we also confront the predictions of our theory with empirical
evidence. We consider the generosity of the welfare state as an exogenous
variable, and study the e⁄ect of this variable on the skill composition of
immigration stocks, in the cases of free and controlled migration. The EU
provides a unique testing ground for the predictions of our parsimonious
model, as there is more or less free migration among EU member states,
whereas each EU member decides on whether, and to what extent, to restrict
migration from the rest of the world.
We employ cross-sectional data from 14 EU countries and other 12 OECD
its economic elite are ￿nally realising. And now they have come up with a last-ditch
plan to avert meltdown: a plan designed to harness the untapped resources of its migrant
community, whose youth, ambition and skills Germany needs to keep its economic engine
running." (FT June 27, 2008). See also Brucker et al (2001).
4countries in the year 2000.3 We form source-host pairs of countries where
only the EU countries (plus Norway and Switzerland) serve as host countries,
whereas all the 26 countries in the sample serve as source countries. The iden-
ti￿cation strategy is a decomposition of the source-host pairs into two groups:
a "free-migration" group (source-host pairs within the EU, plus Norway and
Switzerland) and a "policy-controlled" group of countries (source-host pairs
where the host countries are the same as in the former group, and the source
countries are from the remaining (non EU) countries). We assume, plausibly,
that this free-restricted migration decomposition, which has its origin in the
integration process in Europe that started in the 1950s, could not have as
one of its determinants, the eventual stock of the migrants in the EU states,
some 50 years later.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a parsimonious
model of the welfare state and migration, divided into two alternative migration-
regimes. In the ￿rst regime, political-economy equilibrium of migration is de-
termined by host country, capturing the interests of the skilled and unskilled
workers, as voters; in the second migration regime migration is determined
by the choice of potential migrants in the source country. Section 3 discusses
empirical evidence from the literature literature, focusing on the interaction
between international migration and the welfare state.In section 4 we con-
front the parsimonious model￿ s predictions with international cross section
data. Section 5 presents robustness tests, and Section 6 concludes.
3We restrict attention to OECD countries in order to get a relatively homogeneous
classi￿cation of skill levels.
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u ; 0 < ￿ < 1 (1)
where, Y is the GDP, A denotes a Hicks-neutral productivity parameter, and
Li denotes the input of skilled and unskilled labor i, where i = s;u.
The competitive wages of skilled and unskilled labor are, respectively
ws = ￿Y=Ls (2)
wu = (1 ￿ ￿)Y=Lu
Aggregate labor supply, for skilled and unskilled workers, respectively, is
given by:
Ls = (s + ￿￿)ls (3)
Lu = (1 ￿ s + (1 ￿ ￿)￿)lu
There is a continuum of workers, where the number of native born is normal-
ized to 1; s denotes the share of native born skilled in the total native born
labor supply; ￿ denotes the share of skilled migrants in the total number of
migrants; ￿ denotes the total number of migrants; and li is the labor supply
of an individual with skill level i,i = s;u.
Total population (native born and immigrants) is:
N = 1 + ￿ (4)
4The parsimonious model is developed with the cross-section data is mind. The migra-
tion variable is the stock of migrants; not ￿ ows (as relevant for dynamic analysis).
6We specify a simple welfare-state system which levies a proportional la-
bor income tax of the rate ￿, with the revenues redistributed equally to all
residents (native born and migrants alike), as a demogrant, b; per capita.
The demogrant captures not only a cash transfer but also outlays on public
services such as education, health, etc., that are distributed to all workers,
regardless of their contribution to the tax revenues.
The government budget constraint:
Nb = ￿Y (5)
The utility function for skill-type i is:







where ci denotes consumption of an individual with skill level i, and " > 0.
The individual budget constraint is:
ci = b + (1 ￿ ￿)liwi (7)
Individual utility maximization yields the labor supply equation:
li = (wi (1 ￿ ￿))
" (8)













where: b ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
1￿￿ ; ￿ ￿
1 ￿ s + (1 ￿ ￿)￿
s + ￿￿
To guarantee that ws > wu, we assume:
￿(1 ￿ s)
(1 ￿ ￿)(s + ￿)
> 1 (10)
72.1 Policy-Controlled Migration
Assume that the host country faces a perfectly elastic supply of migrants of
each one of the two skill types, so that host-country migration policy is the
sole determinant of migration ￿ ows. The policy is determined by the majority
of the voters in the host country .We assume that the policy decisions on the
tax rate, ￿; and the total volume of migration, ￿; are exogenous. We do
this in order to focus the analysis on a single endogenous policy variable, the
skill composition of immigrants, ￿: Note that once ￿;￿;￿ are determined,
then the demogrant, b, is given by the budget constraint; we thus denote the
demogrant b as b(￿;￿); where the exogenous variable ￿ is suppressed.
The indirect utility of an individual with skill level i is given by:
Vi (￿;￿) = (11)
















Thus, a change in the share of skilled migrants in the total number of
migrants, ￿, a⁄ects the utility level through two channels. First, an increase
in ￿ raises average labor productivity and thereby tax revenues. This, in
turn, raises the demogrant, b. Second, an increase in ￿ , which raises the
supply of skilled labor relative to the supply of unskilled labor depresses the
skilled- premium in the labor market, ws ￿ wu .
We assume that only the native born is eligible to vote about migration
policy, as the new migrants are yet to enter the country after the vote is taken.
5We assume that second order condition for maximization holds.
8If the decisive voter is unskilled, both of the above e⁄ects are positive. Thus,
an unskilled voter would like to set the skill-composition of migrants at a
corner, ￿ = 1:
If the decisive voter is skilled, however, the two e⁄ects are con￿ icting: an
increase in ￿ raises b but lowers ws. Thus the derivative in equation (12) is
equated to zero by the skilled worker at a level of ￿ below one. This means
that the share of skilled migrants preferred by a skilled voter must be lower
than the share of skilled immigrants preferred by an unskilled voter. De￿ning
￿i as the share of skilled immigrants most preferred by an individual with




Our goal is to ￿nd the e⁄ect of the change in the generosity of the welfare
state on the migration policy concerning ￿. The generosity of the welfare
state, captured by the demogrant, b, depends on the tax rate, ￿ (as the








This means that an exogenous increase in the tax rate, ￿, would leave the
skilled-only migration policy unchanged, if the decisive voter is an unskilled
worker. It is simply because the unskilled median voter prefers only skilled
immigrants regardless of the level of ￿. If, however, the decisive voter is a
skilled worker, an exogenous increase in the tax rate, ￿, must change the
policy concerning the skill-composition of migrants in the direction toward
6Fo detailed derivations, see Appendix A.
9a larger share of skilled immigrants. The reason is that when the tax rates
rise, the redistribution burden upon a skilled decisive voter is increases, and
allowing an additional skilled migrant can ease this ￿scal burden.
2.2 Free Migration
Assume that no restrictions are placed on migration by the policy makers in
the host country. In choosing whether to migrate or not, a potential migrant
of skill i compares his prospect utility, Vi, in the migration destination, to
the reservation utility, denoted by ui in the source country. There is a con-
tinuum of would be migrants, di⁄erent with respect to the reservation utility
level in the source country. This heterogeneity of reservation utilities in the
source country stems for di⁄erent traits of the potential migrants (e.g., fam-
ily size, age, moving costs, forms of portable pensions, housing, cultural ties,
etc.). Thus the host country faces an upward sloping supply curve, S(Vi) of
potential migrants from the source country, for each skill level.
Let ms be the number of skilled migrants, and mu is the number of








The indirect utility function in the host country, no longer dependent on
￿ , is rewritten as:
Vi (￿) = b(￿) +
1
1 + "
(wi (1 ￿ ￿))
1+" (15)
The following equations determine, for each ￿, the cut-o⁄ levels of the
10reservation utilities, us(￿) and uu(￿):
Vi (￿) = u
i (￿), i = s;u (16)
As the number of migrants of each skill level is determined by the supply
of migrants then
# mi(￿) = Si(ui (￿));i = s;u:
We now turn to ￿nd the e⁄ect of the generosity of the welfare state on the
skill mixture of the immigrants. To simplify the analysis we abstract from the
general-equilibrium e⁄ects of migration rates and labor supplies.7 Hence, an
increase in ￿ raises the demogrant, b, but lowers the net wage, wi (1 ￿ ￿): For
skill migrants the fall in net wage outweighs the increase in the demogrant.
Thus, an increase in ￿ reduces the well-being of skill workers. Consequently,
an increase in ￿ reduces the cut-o⁄ reservation utility of skilled migrants,
us (￿): As a result, those skill migrants with reservation utilities between
the old one the new cuto⁄ levels will choose not to migrate. The opposite
holds true for unskilled migrants. Thus the generosity of the welfare state
under free migration deters skilled migrants and attracts unskilled migrants;
thereby tilting the skill composition of migration towards unskilled migrants.




In sum, an exogenous increase of the tax rate, ￿, deters skilled immigrants
and attracts unskilled immigrants. An increase in ￿ raises bene￿ts and lowers
7The general-equilibrium e⁄ects are second-ordere. They do not a⁄ect the qualitative
results in this sub-section..
11disposable private income. Consequently, among the net contributors to the
welfare state, skilled migrants, those with high reservation wage decide not
to migrate; among those who are potentially net bene￿ciary from the welfare
state, the unskilled workers, infra-marginally change their decision in favor
of migration.
3 Empirical Evidence on Welfare Migration
The existing literature addresses the issue of how the welfare-state generos-
ity works as a magnet to migrants ￿ - the "welfare migration" phenomenon.8
Southwick (1981) shows that high welfare-state bene￿t gap, between the ori-
gin and destination regions in the U.S., increases the share the welfare-state
bene￿t recipients among the migrants. Gramlich and Laren (1984) analyze
a sample from the 1980 U.S. Census data and ￿nd that the high bene￿t
regions have more welfare recipients￿migrants than the low-bene￿t regions.
Using the same data, Blank (1988) employs a multinomial logit model to
show that welfare bene￿ts have a signi￿cant positive e⁄ect over the location
choice of female-headed households. Similarly, Enchautegui (1997) ￿nds a
positive e⁄ect of welfare bene￿ts over the migration decision of women with
young children. Meyer (2000) employs conditional logit model as well as the
comparison-group method to analyze the 1980 and 1990 U.S. Census data.
He ￿nds signi￿cant welfare induced migration, particularly for high school
dropouts. Borjas (1999), who uses the same data set ￿nds that low skilled
migrants are much more heavily clustered in high bene￿t states, in compar-
8Brueckner (2000) provides a review of empirical studies regarding welfare migration.
12ison to other migrants or natives. Gelbach (2000) ￿nds strong evidence of
welfare migration in 1980, but less in 1990. McKinnish (2005, 2007) also
￿nds evidence for welfare migration, especially for those who are located
close to state borders (where migration costs are lower). Walker (1994) uses
the 1990 US Census data and ￿nds strong evidence in support of welfare-
induced migration. Levine and Zimmerman (1999) who employ data for the
period 1979-1992, and estimate a probit model ￿nd, however, that welfare
bene￿ts have little e⁄ect on the probability of female-headed households (the
recipients of the bene￿ts) to relocate.
Peridy (2006) studies migration rates in 18 OECD host countries from 67
source countries. He ￿nds that the host-source ratio of welfare-state bene￿ts
(as measured by total public spending) has a signi￿cant positive e⁄ect on mi-
gration. De Giorgi and Pellizzari (2006) conduct an empirical investigation of
migrants from outside the EU-15. Using the conditional logit approach, they
￿nd that welfare-state bene￿ts do attract migrants. When interacted with
the education level, welfare bene￿ts show also a positive e⁄ect on the proba-
bility of the lowest group of education; whereas probabilities of the secondary
and tertiary education groups are not signi￿cantly a⁄ected. 9 Docquier at el.
(2006) study the determinants of migration stocks in the OECD countries in
the year 2000, where the migrants from 184 countries are classi￿ed according
9Welfare-bene￿ts, for that matter, are de￿ned as monthly bene￿t received by a typical
40 years old person who has continuously worked and paid contributions since the age
of 18, averaged over 60 months of non-employment, two earning levels relatively to the
average production worker and three types of family status. The results are robust to
replacing the welfare bene￿ts measure with public expenditure on unemployment related
bene￿ts.
13to three education levels.10 They ￿nd that the social welfare programs en-
courage the migration of both skilled and unskilled migrants. However, the
unskilled are motivated by social expenditure much more than the skilled.
Thus they claim that the skill composition of migrants is adversely e⁄ected
by the welfare-state bene￿ts.
Recall that our parsimonious model predicts a di⁄erential e⁄ect on mi-
gration and its skill composition, depending on whether migration is free
or policy-controlled. Therefore, in order to obtain unbiased estimates of the
generosity of the welfare state on migration (and on its skill composition), one
must control for the migration regime (free versus controlled). This means
that the studies of migration between states within the U.S. (such as Bor-
jas (1999), for example), which are evidently con￿ned to a single migration
regime (namely, free migration), can produce unbiased results. Other stud-
ies that employ samples that are con￿ned to the policy-controlled migration
regime, but at the same time employ a model of the migrants￿choice, whether
to migrate or not, and if so where to migrate to, are evidently inconsistent. In
this case the estimates convey little information on the migrant choices (and,
therefore on the welfare state as a magnet to unskilled migrants). Rather, the
samle conveys information on the migration policy choices by the host coun-
try. Those studies that refer to both migration regimes, without controlling
for them, are not easily interpretable because they convey a mixture of in-
formation on migration policies in the host country, and on the individual
migrant￿ s migration choices in the source country.
10The data used in Section 4 is extracted from the same database which is used in
Docquier et al. (2006).. The database is presented in Docquier and Marfouk (2006).
144 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Testable Hypotheses
There are two main predictions of the parsimonious model, which we like to
test. First, if migration is free, the generosity of the welfare state has an
adverse e⁄ect on the skill composition of migrants. A typical skilled migrant
is more likely to move to a less generous welfare state; and move to a less
generous host country with a lower tax rate rather than to a more generous
country with a higher tax rate, other things being equal. Second, in the case
that the skill composition of migration is policy-controlled, then the more
generous is the welfare state, the more the skill composition of migrants is
tilted towards skilled migrants.
As explained before, both results hinge on the redistributive aspects of the
welfare state. Under free migration, equilibrium migration re￿ ects (among
others) the choice of the migrants. Thus, a generous welfare state generating
a ￿scal burden on skilled immigrants, is a deterrent for skilled migration. In
the policy-controlled migration regime, however, the interest of the native-
born in the host country, as is re￿ ected in the voting equilibrium, are at play.
Fiscal burden associated with the generosity of the welfare state, which falls
on skilled native born, induces this interest group to endorse higher rates of
skilled migration. The unskilled native born is in favor of maximum level of
skilled migration, both for redistributive reasons and for labor complemen-
tarity reasons.11
11In the data, possibly, both e⁄ects exist. That is, the skill composition of immigrants
can be a⁄ected both by the political economy equilibrium policy in the host country, as
15Formally, an increase in the generosity of the welfare state, as captured
by the tax rate, ￿, adversely a⁄ects the skill composition of migrants, in the
free-migration regime, that is d￿F
d￿ < 0.
An increase in the generosity of the welfare state has a more pronounced
e⁄ect on the share of skilled migrants of total migrants when the migration-
regime is policy-controlled, that is, d￿R
d￿ > 0. Denote by ￿Fand ￿R, respec-
tively, the skill composition of migrants in free migration regime and the
policy-controlled regime. Consequently, we expect d￿R￿￿F
d￿ > 0.
4.2 Identi￿cation Strategy
To confront the prediction of the parsimonious model with a cross section
data of source-host (developed) country pairs, we decompose the sample into
two groups. The ￿rst group contains source-host pairs of countries which
enable free mobility of labor among themselves. They also prohibit any
kind of discrimination between native born and migrants, regarding labor
market accessibility and welfare-state bene￿ts eligibility. These are 16 Eu-
ropean countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, U.K., Norway
and Switzerland. The data for this group, therefore, records bilateral migra-
tion stock for any pair of these countries.
well as by the considerations of the immigrant who considers other alternative host coun-
tries. Nevertheless, we expect the political economy consideration to be more dominant
in restricted migration regimes than in free migration regimes. Similarly, we expect the
considerations of the immigrants regarding alternative host countries to be more dominant
in free migration regimes than in restricted ones.
16The second group includes source-host pairs of countries, within which
the source country residents cannot necessarily move freely into either of the
host country without any restriction. The host countries are the same 16
countries from the ￿rst group; the source countries are 10 developed non-
European countries: U.S., Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Israel,
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea and Singapore.
This decomposition is key to the identi￿cation strategy. It enables us
to plausibly assume that migration is free among the 16 countries of the
￿rst group, and is e⁄ectively restricted by policy controls with respect to
migrants from source countries of the second group. It is plausible to as-
sume that the categorizing of both groups is exogenous to our dependent
variable, the skill composition of immigrants. Thus we can identify the dif-
ferential e⁄ect of the generosity of the welfare state on the skill composition
of immigrants across the two groups (the "free migration" group and the
"policy-restricted migration" group) in an unbiased way.
The reason that it is safe to assume that this decomposition is exogenous
to thee dependent variable, th skill composition of immigrants, is that the
European integration is the result of long term developments of multilateral
treaties, whose content extends far beyond the issue of immigrants and their
skill composition. The historical development of the "free migration" group
goes far back. The Treaty of Paris (1951) established the European Coal and
Steel Community (ECSC) and was signed by France, West Germany, Italy,
Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The underlying idea was based
on supra-nationalism, aiming to help the economy of Europe and prevent
future war by integrating its members together. This treaty, among other
17things, enabled the right to free movement for workers in these industries.
Following that, the Treaty of Rome (1957) established the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC), signed by the same 6 countries. The main aim of
the EEC was to "preserve peace and liberty and to lay the foundations of an
ever closer union among the peoples of Europe". This treaty also provided
for the free movement of all workers within the EEC.
The ￿rst enlargement was in 1973, with the accession of Denmark, Ireland
and the United Kingdom. In 1981 Greece has joined, and Spain and Portugal
became members in 1986. Transitional periods of 6 years, postponing free
labor mobility were introduced for these three countries. In 1990, after the
fall of the Iron Curtain, the former East Germany became part of the EEC
as part of a newly reunited Germany. The Maastricht Treaty came into force
on 1 November 1993, introducing the European Union (EU), which absorbed
the EEC as one of its three pillars, to be called as the European Community
(EC). The agreements reiterated the free movement of persons (article 39).
That is, citizens can move freely between member states to live, work, study
or retire in another country. Such freedom of movement also entails the
abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the
member states as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of
work and employment. Austria, Sweden and Finland joined in 1995. These
countries together form the EU-15 (or, the "old members states").12
12The accession treaties normally allow for the introduction of ￿ transitional measures￿ .
For instance, transitional periods of 6 years, postponing free labor mobility were intro-
duced with respect to Greece, Spain and Portugal. The transitional measures obliges the
member states to declare whether they will open up their labor markets for workers from
the newly accessed countries, or keep restrictions in place for several (limited) years. In
18The European Economic Area (EEA) came into being on January 1, 1994.
The contracting parties to the EEA agreement are Iceland, Liechtenstein and
Norway - and the EU Member States along with the European Community.
Switzerland is not part of the EEA. However, Switzerland is linked to the
European Union by bilateral agreements. The EEA as well as the Switzerland
bilateral agreements with the EU are based on the same "four freedoms" as
the European Community, which includes the free mobility of labor and equal
treatment clauses.13
the eastern accession of the EU-8 (Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia) in 2004, the restrictions will de￿nitely end on 30 April
2011. A similar scheme (known as ￿ 2+3+2￿on account of the possible periods of restric-
tions) is in place with respect to workers from Romania and Bulgaria, which joined the EU
on 1 January 2007. Most EU-15 Member States (with the exception of the United King-
dom, Ireland and Sweden) took the decision after the 2004 EU enlargement to maintain
restrictions on the cross-border mobility of labour from the EU-8 (Malta and Cyprus were
excluded from these restrictions), which delayed the migrant ￿ ow between the EU-8 and
EU-15 Member States for up to seven years. Portugal, Finland, Spain and from July 2006
also Italy decided to lift restrictions, while Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands
and Luxembourg decided to alleviate them. The restrictions remain unchanged in Austria
and Germany.
13This historical sketch is based on the descriptions in Wikipedia of the Treaties of
Rome, the E.U., the E.E.A. and the Four Freedoms.
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0; if s;h are in the EU
1; if s is not in the EU and h is in the EU
where me
s;h denotes the ratio of the stock of migrants of skill level e, originated
in source country s and residing in host country h, to the stock of all native
workers of skill level e in the source, country s;, in the year 2000; R is
a dummy variable, whis is equal to 0 if the source-host pair exercise free
migration between them, and 1 otherwise; Bh denotes the average bene￿ts
per capita in the host country h, in the years 1974-1990. The remaining
controls are denoted by Xs;h: the ratio of the stock of skilled migrants, from
source country s in host country h to the stock of all native skilled migrants in
the source country s, in the year 1990; a similar ratio for unskilled migrants;
the log of skilled native-born workers in the host country h in year 1990; and
a similar proportion for the unskilled. We also interact all variables with the
decomposition dummy variable. The coe¢ cients are depicted by the vectors,
￿ and ￿. The error term is denoted by ue
s;h, which can be divided into two
components: a skill independent e⁄ect, ￿s;h, and a skill-dependent e⁄ect ￿e
s;h.
This simple model estimates the e⁄ects of the bene￿ts per capita (and
the other control variables) on the emigration share, m, for each skill level.
Note that ￿s;h re￿ ects some omitted variables which are skill independent. In
order to avoid the skill-independent- omitted-variable bias, we de￿ne a skill-
20di⁄erences model (a version of di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence model), by subtracting
the two equations in (18):
￿ms;h = ￿￿0+￿￿1Rs;h+￿￿2Bh+￿￿3Rs;h￿Bh+Xs;h￿￿1+Xs;hRs;h￿￿2+￿s;h
(19)
where ￿ is the skill-di⁄erences operator.
The dependent variable, ￿m, can be considered as a measure for the
skill composition of immigrants. The skill-di⁄erences model, (19), estimates
therefore relative e⁄ects of the regressors over ￿m. The higher ￿m is, the
more upgraded is the skill composition the immigrants. Hence, a positive
estimation of a certain coe¢ cient indicates a positive e⁄ect on the skill com-
position measure of the immigrants, and vice versa.14
An important statistical feature of the model is that it eliminates part
of the error term, ￿s;h. Any variable whose impact on migration is skill
invariant, is canceled out. Additionally, by the inclusion of past migration
stocks in Xs;h we are able to account for key time invariant e⁄ects.
Note that the e⁄ect of ￿ on ￿F is captured in the above equation by the
coe¢ cient ￿￿2. Therefore, the null hypothesis describing the e⁄ect of ￿ on
￿F becomes ￿￿2 < 0:Also, the e⁄ect of ￿ on ￿R is captured by the coe¢ cient
￿￿2 + ￿￿3. Therefore the null hypothesis describing the the e⁄ect of ￿ on
￿R ￿ ￿F becomes ￿￿3 > 0:
14Naturally the estimation of ￿￿ can be obtained directly from (18), by estimating
each skill-dependent equation separately. As all skill-dependent equations in (18) have
the same determinants, the coe¢ cients ￿￿ are simply the respective di⁄erence of the
separated estimation, ￿
h and ￿
l. However, extracting the estimation for ￿￿ from the DD
model, (19), enables us to directly test the signi￿cance of the coe¢ cients which are related
to the di⁄erences in the levels of the explanatory variables.
21A potential endogeneity problem, between the level of bene￿ts in the host
country, Bh , and the skill composition of the migrants, ￿ms;h, may arise,
because skill immigrants can in￿ uence the political economic equilibrium
level of bene￿ts.15 One way go around this problem is to take the average
level of bene￿ts over a long, pre-2000, period (1974-1990), as we indeed do.
Recall that we also control for past migration stock rate (in 1990). Thus
only migration between 1990-2000 is to be explained by the lagged bene￿t
variable, a predetermined variable. Importantly, in addition, we also run IV
estimation, using the legal origin in the host country (English, Scandinavian,
or French-German) as instrument. The legal origin, a century old construct,
was put in place without having the 2000 migration in mind. The legal origin
is however, closely linked to national attitudes towards the generosity of the
welfare state, and its institutional setups. It is therefore likely to be strongly
correlated with Bh.
We also provide several robustness estimations, including additional vari-
ables like distance, common language and others.
4.4 Data Description
Migration data are taken from Docquier and Marfouk (2006). The data set
contains bilateral stock of migrants, based on census and register data, for
the years 1990 and 2000. Stock variables are more attractive for analysis than
￿ ows because our model describes a long-run equilibrium of migration and
voting decisions. Also, as indicated by Docquier and Marfouk (2006), data on
15For a political-economy model and evidence on the e⁄ect of migrants on the generosity
of the welfare state, see Razin, Sadka and Swagell (2002).
22migration ￿ ows are less reliable than stock data, because ￿ ow data disregard
return migration movements, which may distort the estimation. Immigrants
are at working age (25+), de￿ned as foreign born, subdivided into three
classes of education level: low-skilled (0-8 schooling years), medium-skilled
(9-12 schooling years) and high-skilled (13+ schooling years).
Data for welfare-state bene￿ts per capita is based on OECD￿ s Analytical
Database (average for 1974-1990). Social expenditure encompass all kinds
of social public expenditures, in cash or in kind, including, for instance,
old age transfers, incapacity related bene￿ts, health care, unemployment
compensations and other social expenditures. The data is PPP-converted to
1990 U.S. dollars.
4.5 Main Findings
Table 1 presents the main estimation results. Columns 1 and 2 report OLS
regressions results; columns 3 and 4 report IV regression results, using the
legal origin of the host countries as the instrumental variable. The di⁄erence
between columns 1 and 3, on one hand, and columns 2 and 4, on the other
hand, is in the variables of the vector Xs;h. Columns 1 and 3 contain only
the migration stock shares, skilled and unskilled, in the year 1990. Columns
2 and 4 include also the log-values of the skilled-unskilled native labor stocks
ratio, in the host country, in the year 1990.
The ￿rst null hypothesis, is that ￿￿2 < 0. It captures the migrant choices
in the free migration regime. Indeed, the coe¢ cient is negative and signi￿cant
in all four regressions. That is, the generosity of the welfare state adversely
a⁄ects the skill composition of migrants in the free migration regime. The
23OLS OLS IV IV
benefits per capita (host country) -0.139 -0.111 -0.199 -0.205
(0.049)*** (0.054)** (0.079)** (0.086)**
benefits per capita (host country) X R 0.135 0.133 0.195 0.226
(0.054)** (0.061)** (0.079)** (0.088)**
migration stock share in 1990 - low skilled -0.755 -0.757 -0.750 -0.750
(0.097)*** (0.095)*** (0.098)*** (0.097)***
migration stock share in 1990 - low skilled X R 1.673 1.694 1.669 1.687
(0.185)*** (0.180)*** (0.185)*** (0.181)***
migration stock share in 1990 - high skilled 1.076 1.082 1.071 1.071
(0.131)*** (0.127)*** (0.132)*** (0.130)***
migration stock share in 1990 - high skilled X R -0.729 -0.734 -0.723 -0.723
(0.134)*** (0.130)*** (0.135)*** (0.133)***
high-low labor ratio in 1990 (host country) -0.459 -0.459
(0.165)*** (0.165)***
high-low labor ratio in 1990 (host country) X F -0.088 0.221
(0.558) (0.542)
Observations 400 400 400 400
R-squared 0.857 0.858 0.856 0.856
Migration into 16 European countries, from 26 developed countries (inclusive of the 16 host countries, among
which free migration is allowed);
F (R) is a dummy variable for the 16 (10) source countries whose migration into the 16 host countries is (not) free
IV: legal origin of the host country (English, Scandivavian, German-French)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Dependent Variable: High-Low Difference in Migration Stock Shares at 2000
Table 1: Welfare Migration: The High-Low Skilled di⁄erential E⁄ect between
Free and Policy-Controlled Migration Regimes
magnitude of the coe¢ cient is even higher in the IV regressions than the
OLS regressions. Whether we include the full set of the variables inXs;h in
the regressions (columns 2 and 4) or not (columns 1 and 3) does not seem to
have much of an e⁄ect on on the magnitude of the coe¢ cient.
The second null hypothesis is that ￿￿3 > 0. It indicates the consider-
ations of the host country￿ s voters in policy controlled migration regimes.
Indeed, the coe¢ cient is positive and signi￿cant in all four regressions. That
is, the e⁄ect of the generosity of the welfare state on the skill composition
of migrants is more pronounced in the policy-controlled migration regime.
The magnitude of the coe¢ cient is even higher in the IV regressions than
24the OLS regressions. Again, whether we include the full set of the variables
in Xs;h in the regressions (columns 2 and 4) or not (columns 1 and 3) does
not seem to have much of an e⁄ect on the magnitude of the coe¢ cient.
Turning to the other control variables, Xs;h, the e⁄ect of low (high) skilled
migration stock rate in 1990 on the skill-composition of migration in 2000
is negative (positive) and signi￿cant, in the free migration regime. An in-
terpretation of this result is that in the free-migration regime there is an
inertia over time for each skilled group of migrants. More unskilled migrants
bring about further waves of unskilled migrants; and similarly, more skilled
migrants bring about further waves of skilled migrants.
In the policy controlled migration regime, past migration of the unskilled
increases the skill composition of immigrants in 2000 (past skilled migration
increases the skill composition of immigrants in 2000, but less than in the
free migration regime). The interpretation of this result, consistent with
our model, is that having initially (i.e., in 1990) a large stock of unskilled
migrants, which poses a ￿scal burden on the welfare state, induces its voters
to opt for more skilled migrants in order to ease the burden. This explanation
is supported in columns 2 and 4, where we account for the quantity of high-
low skilled voters ratio, in the host countries. One can see that as this ratio
is higher, the skill composition of immigrants is lower. Clearly, this outcome
is in line with our model, wherein ￿s < ￿u.
4.6 Robustness Tests
First we replicate Table 1 with respect to the medium-skilled versus the low-
skilled.
25OLS OLS IV IV
benefits per capita (host country) -0.215 -0.126 -0.173 -0.152
(0.082)*** (0.082) (0.065)*** (0.068)**
benefits per capita (host country) X R 0.198 0.113 0.156 0.139
(0.082)** (0.083) (0.065)** (0.068)**
migration stock share in 1990 - low skilled -0.668 -0.666 -0.670 -0.665
(0.139)*** (0.133)*** (0.139)*** (0.132)***
migration stock share in 1990 - low skilled X R 0.130 0.133 0.132 0.132
(0.224) (0.221) (0.224) (0.221)
migration stock share in 1990 - medium skilled 0.890 0.895 0.892 0.894
(0.159)*** (0.152)*** (0.159)*** (0.151)***
migration stock share in 1990 - medium skilled X R 0.293 0.286 0.290 0.287
(0.402) (0.401) (0.402) (0.401)
medium-low labor ratio in 1990 (host country) -0.065 -0.065
(0.056) (0.056)
medium-low labor ratio in 1990 (host country) X F -1.663 -1.614
(0.485)*** (0.485)***
Observations 400 400 400 400
R-squared 0.727 0.746 0.726 0.746
Migration into 16 European countries, from 26 developed countries (inclusive of the 16 host countries, among
which free migration is allowed);
F (R) is a dummy variable for the 16 (10) source countries whose migration into the 16 host countries is (not) free
IV: legal origin of the host country (English, Scandivavian, German-French)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Dependent Variable: Medium-Low Difference in Migration Stock Shares at 2000
Table 2: Welfare Migration: The Medium-Low Skilled di⁄erential E⁄ect
between Free and Policy-Controlled Migration Regimes
As can be seen, the coe¢ cient of welfare bene￿ts, for free migration
regimes, is negative and signi￿cant (in the second column, however, it is
signi￿cant only at 13%). The coe¢ cient of welfare bene￿ts in policy con-
trolled regimes is signi￿cantly higher (again, with the exception of the second
column).
We now extend the main speci￿cation so as to account for standrd vari-
ables used in international immigration examinations. We include a dummy
variable, accounting for common language between any source-host pairs, the
log value of the great circle distance, in miles, between all source-host pairs,
and the GDP per capita average in 1974-1990, in real terms converted into
26PPP US$, for both the source and host countries:16
OLS OLS IV IV
benefits per capita (host country) -0.138 -0.147 -0.279 -0.320
(0.068)** (0.070)** (0.122)** (0.133)**
benefits per capita (host country) X R 0.159 0.167 0.301 0.340
(0.072)** (0.074)** (0.123)** (0.134)**
migration stock share in 1990 - low skilled -0.750 -0.751 -0.742 -0.741
(0.096)*** (0.095)*** (0.098)*** (0.097)***
migration stock share in 1990 - low skilled X R 1.710 1.711 1.702 1.701
(0.166)*** (0.165)*** (0.167)*** (0.166)***
migration stock share in 1990 - high skilled 1.076 1.081 1.063 1.065
(0.128)*** (0.123)*** (0.130)*** (0.127)***
migration stock share in 1990 - high skilled X R -0.731 -0.736 -0.718 -0.720
(0.130)*** (0.126)*** (0.133)*** (0.129)***
high-low labor ratio in 1990 (host country) -0.342 -0.342
(0.199)* (0.199)*
high-low labor ratio in 1990 (host country) X F -0.852 -0.962
(0.874) (0.896)
common language -0.061 -0.076 -0.039 -0.051
(0.048) (0.054) (0.049) (0.052)
common language X R 0.027 0.049 0.005 0.024
(0.059) (0.064) (0.058) (0.061)
log distance 0.044 0.035 0.055 0.048
(0.034) (0.031) (0.036) (0.033)
log distance X R 0.014 0.023 0.003 0.010
(0.039) (0.037) (0.041) (0.039)
GDP per capita (host country) 0.029 0.188 0.178 0.385
(0.074) (0.129) (0.128) (0.205)*
GDP per capita (host country) X R -0.097 -0.208 -0.247 -0.405
(0.080) (0.136) (0.130)* (0.207)*
GDP per capita (source country) -0.062 -0.070 -0.051 -0.057
(0.084) (0.085) (0.082) (0.084)
GDP per capita (source country) X R 0.031 0.038 0.020 0.026
(0.084) (0.086) (0.083) (0.085)
Observations 400 400 400 400
R-squared 0.863 0.865 0.860 0.861
Migration into 16 European countries, from 26 developed countries (inclusive of the 16 host countries, among
which free migration is allowed);
F (R) is a dummy variable for the 16 (10) source countries whose migration into the 16 host countries is (not) free
IV: legal origin of the host country (English, Scandivavian, German-French)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Dependent Variable: High-Low Difference in Migration Stock Shares at 2000
Table 3: Welfare Migration: The High-Low Skilled di⁄erential E⁄ect between
Free and Policy-Controlled Migration Regimes under Di⁄erent Speci￿cation
Again, the results are very similar to the ones presented in Table 1, where
the IV estimations pronounc our theory predictions even more.
16The GDP per capita data is taken from Heston, Alan, Robert Summers and Bettina
Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.2, Center for International Comparisons of Production,
Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, September 2006.
275 Conclusion
Migration is often viewed as an economic force, which can mitigate the ￿scal
burden induced by the process of aging. The reason is that an in￿ ow of young
working age immigrants may slow down population aging and help paying
for social security. However, on the other hand, because immigrants often
have low education and high fertility rates, their net ￿scal impact may be
costly rather than bene￿cial. Storesletten (2000) and Lee and Miller (2000)
calibrate a general equilibrium overlapping generations model to investigates
whether a reform of immigration policies could resolve the ￿scal problems
associated with aging. Storesletten ￿nds that selective immigration policies,
involving increased in￿ ow of working-age high and medium-skilled immi-
grants, can remove the need for a future ￿scal reform. Lee and Miller, on the
other hand, base their conclusion on that immigrants have lower education
and higher fertility rates than that of the native born population. Thus if
more immigrants are admitted into the economy, they will ease temporar-
ily the projected ￿scal burden associated with the retirement of the baby
boomers. But the overall ￿scal consequences are relatively small.
Providing evidence on whether immigrants pay their way in the welfare-
state is addressed in a series of in￿ uential paper by Borjas (1991, 1994,
1996). Razin and Sadka (2000, 2004) address the issue of the ￿scal burden
associated with immigrants in a pay-as-you-go ￿scal system. They show
that the additional ￿scal burden could be shifted forward inde￿nitely, and
all cohorts of the native born in the present and in the future could gain from
the initial in￿ ux of unskilled migrants.17
17An empirical investigation of the e⁄ect of the proportion of elderly people in the
28We conclude by noting the potential for a reversed possible e⁄ects that
run from the skill composition of migrants to the generosity of the welfare
state; and interactions between the skill composition of migrants and the
generosity of the welfare state. The e⁄ect of immigration on the generosity
of the welfare-state is addressed by Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002). They
use data for 11 European countries during 1974-1992, and ￿nd that the coef-
￿cient of the share of immigrants in the host country population is negative
in the labor tax, and welfare-state bene￿ts regressions. They also ￿nd some
evidence that the medium and high educated group among the immigrants
have a positive coe¢ cient in the tax rate regression. They interpreted the
result in terms of "￿scal leakage" from the median voter toward unskilled mi-
grants, and "￿scal gift" from skilled migrants to the median voter. Facchini,
Razin and Willmann (2004) treat the welfare-state bene￿ts and immigration
as being jointly determined. Some of their regressions show that the ￿s-
cal -leakage e⁄ect dominates the shift-in-the median voter e⁄ect , but some
other show the opposite. Facchini, Razin and Willmann (2004) provide an
empirical study attempting to capture the interaction between tax-welfare
and immigration, both as endogenous variables, so as to analyze welfare-
state magnet for international data. The analysis supports the welfare-state
magnet argument, when labor tax rates proxy the welfare-state program.
However, if tax rates are replaced by welfare-state transfers (per capita), the
results become statistically insigni￿cant.
population on the size of social security bene￿t per retiree turn out not to be signi￿cant
(Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999) and Breyer and Craig (1997) and also negative (Razin,
Sadka and Swagel (2002).
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which is true by assumption, equation (10). Additionally, observe that:
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which, indicates, as expected, that wages of each skill type fall with its pro-
portions in the labor market.
Then it follows from the equations in the text that
@Vu(￿;￿)
@￿ > 0:Therefore,
if the decisive voter is an unskilled individual he opts for ￿u = 1, no matter
34what is ￿. Thus d￿u
d￿ = 0:When the decisive voter is a skilled individual, he
opts for a skill composition of migrants, ￿S, which is given by the ￿rst order
condition
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which entails that ms decreases.
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